Evidence: Impeachment of Verdict When Jurors Obtain Independent Information by unknown
EVIDENCE: IMPEACHMENT OF VERDICT WHEN JURORS
OBTAIN INDEPENDENT INFORMATION
A. RECENT North Carolina decision, In re Hall's Will' raises the possi-
bility of circumventing the common law rule that jurors may not im-
peach their own verdicts. An action brought to invalidate a will on
grounds of mental incapacity and undue influence resulted in a verdict
for the propounders. The caveators moved to set aside the verdict, sub-
mitting affidavits of eight jurors to the effect that one juror had brought
a volume of an encyclopedia into the jury room and read aloud the
definition of "undue influence." 2 The affidavits further stated that this
definition was studied by several of the jurors and generally relied upon
in reaching the verdict.' The trial judge refused to set aside the verdict,
and this ruling was appealed. The North Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed, two justices dissenting.
The majority correctly stated that it is improper for a jury to use
law books or dictionaries to discern the law or determine the meaning
of terms.4  Nevertheless, the court refused to disturb the ruling below,
holding that no evidence should be received from the jurors themselves
that would tend to impeach their verdict.5 The opinion went further,
however, and determined that the extraneous matter was not prejudicial
to appellants. Obviously, the court did not need to consider prejudicial
effect because its prohibition against impeaching verdicts by juror affi-
davits was conclusive of the point on appeal.
The common law rule that jurors may not testify to misconduct on
their part in order to impeach their verdicts derives from Lord Mans-
field's opinion in V4se v. Delaval.6 It is based on the premise that
2 5 2 N.C. 70, 113 S.E.2d I (196o).See z7 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 276 (192o). The encyclopedia discusses "un-
due influence" not only in testamentary suits but also in situations involving force,
violence and intimidation in elections.
s The affidavits are set forth in the Record, pp. 25o-68. The encyclopedia apparent-
ly was relied upon extensively: "I would guess that the other jurors read this section
on 'undue influence' at least a hundred times." Affidavit of Norris A. Hall, foreman
of the jury, Record, p. 254.
'See generally 89 C.J.S. Trial § 4 6s(b) (1955)-
a25z N.C. at 87-88, 113 S.E.zd at 13. For precedents in this jurisdiction of the
rule against impeachment see STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 65 (1946).
6 1 T.R. I , 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). In place of the jurors themselves,
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a witness shall not be heard to allege his own turpitude." Several other
eighteenth-century rules of evidence rested on this same premise, but
few have currency today. 8 Their demise may partially be attributed
to the unsoundness of the premise itself. In contrast, the Delaval rule,
though an innovation in the law,9 became widely accepted because of
Lord Mansfield's influence.' 0 The rule has long been sustained by
policies favoring convenience in judicial administration and stability of
verdicts." Indeed, many courts fear that its abandonment would
permit disappointed litigants to harass jurors in an effort to establish
their misconduct as grounds for overturning an adverse verdict. 2
Although the Delaval rule has become well entrenched judicially,
it has been abrogated by statute in several jurisdictions."8 Moreover,
however, the court would hear one who by chance or design overheard jury delibera-
tions.
7The premises of this era enjoyed greater authority when stated in Latin, thus:
"Nemo turpitudinem suam allegans audietur."
SSe 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2352(C) (3 d ed. 1940), MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 68 n.12 (1954).
For English cases before Vaise v. Delaval permitting jurors to testify to juror mis-
conduct, see: Norman v. Beamont, Willes 484, 125 Eng. Rep. izgi (C.P. 1744);
Philips v. Fowler, Barnes 44, 94 Eng. Rep. 994 (K.B. 1735). In American practice
up until the early nineteenth century, jurors' affidavits of misconduct were frequently
received by the courts. E.g., see: Talmadge v. Northrop, i Root 522 (Conn. 1793);
Smith v. Cheetham, 3 Caines 57 (N.Y. 18o5); Bradley v. Bradley, 4 Dall. 1z (Pa.
1792); Crawford v. State, 2 Yerg. 6o (Tenn. 1821). The decision in Grinnell v.
Phillips, i Mass. 530 (i8o5), admits the testimony of jurors to show certain "overt
acts" (i.e., formal defects in jury conduct) but not to examine the effects of miscon-
duct on individual jurors in reaching a decision. This viewpoint corresponds with
the present minority American rule.
"0 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 8.
"See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915) and authorities cited therein. The
convenience which the Delaval rule occasions has been characterized by Learned Hand,
J., in these words: "[J]udges again and again repeat the consecrated rubric which
has so confused the subject; it offers an easy escape from embarrassing choices." Jorgen-
son v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 16o F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1947). He also appraises
the prospects of the rule in the federal courts: ". . . what evidence shall be competent to
prove the facts when the facts do require the verdict to be set aside, as concededly
some facts do[ ?] The two decisions of the Supreme Court which we have cited, as
well as its approach in United States v. Reid [53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (x85x)] and
Hyde v. United States [225 U.S. 347 (1912)], suggest it as not improbable that when
the question arises in the future, the testimony of the jurors may be held competent,
and that we shall no longer hear that they may not 'impeach their verdict,' when it is
'im,'eachable' if what they say is true." Ibid.
"E.g., McDonald v. Pless, supra note ix Cluggage v. Swan, 4 Binn. 5o (Pa.
x1x).
" McCoRMicK, EVIDENCE § 68 n.x 5 .
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the Hall case reflects judicial discomfiture with the rule. The majority
was dearly hesitant to rest its decision solely on a strict application of this
rule forbidding impeachment of verdicts, as is shown by its considera-
tion of the extraneous matter. Since there was no evidence in this case
other than the juror affidavits to show that the jurors had used an ency-
dopedia, under the Delaval rule the verdict could not be set aside, even
if prejudice were found. But the court suggested that the trial judge
would have set aside the verdict in spite of the rule against impeaching
verdicts, if any harm had been done."4 This suggestion indicates that
the court would allow a trial judge to consider the prejudicial effect of
juror misconduct and then exercise his general discretionary power to set
aside verdicts"5 accordingly, regardless of the source of the information
tending to prove misconduct. Although juror affidavits are not properly
admissible to impeach the verdict directly, they would apparently be a
suitable foundation for the exercise of the trial judge's discretionary
power to set aside a verdict. The trial judge in the Hall case apparently
did not know that he might circumvent the Delaval rule in this
manner.
10
""In our opinion, the patient, painstaking, impartial, and learned judge who pre-
sided at the trial below would have set the verdict aside in his discretion, notwithstanding
the foregoing rule of law, had he considered that the incident worked an injustice to
appellants." Moore, J., 252 N.C. at 88, 113 S.E.zd at 13.
1 This power is based on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-207 (1953): "The judge who tries
the cause may, in his discretion, entertain a motion, to be made on his minutes, to
set aside a verdict and grant a new trial upon exceptions, or for insufficient evidence,
or for excessive damages .... " As to the scope and exercise of the power, see generally
2 MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1593-96 (2d ed. 2956).
It has long been dear that trial judges should exercise their discretionary power under
this statute to set aside verdicts prejudiced by juror misconduct where some evidence of
(or at least good grounds for suspicion of) juror misconduct existed even in the
absence of juror affidavits. The Hall decision apparently authorizes trial judges to
exercise such power even if no evidence whatsoever of juror misconduct is available
except from the jurors themselves (which is clearly an evasion of the Delaval rule).
If the trial judge puts on record the circumstances inducing his order or refusal of a new
trial, then the Supreme Court may review such order or refusal if it presents a matter
of law. Moore v. Edmiston, 70 N.C. 471 (1874); 2 MCINTOSH, op. cit. supra at
§ 1596(7) n. 48. However, the record may not always show the circumstances on
which an order setting aside the verdict (or the refusal of such an order) is based. If in
such situation the record shows that the trial judge's ruling was based on his dis-
cretionary power, then there can ordinarily be no review. Bird v. Bradburn, 131 N.C.
488, 42 S.E. 936 (1902).
" The Record, p. 270, gives the trial court's consideration of the matter after the
affidavits were presented to it. "Court: I realize the authenticity of the affidavits, that
nobody seems to be questioning the fact that this happened and Mr. Hall used it [the
encyclopedia], for whatever effect it may have, but it is a right unusual attack on a
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The dissenters in the Hall decision shared the majority's distaste
for use of extrinsic evidence by a jury. However, they took the straight-
forward position that consideration of such evidence by the jury renders
the verdict impeachable, even by juror affidavits, if the appellant was
prejudiced.17  This position corresponds with the law of a few states,18
where affidavits of jurors may be received "for the purpose of avoiding
a verdict, to show any matter occurring during the trial or in the jury
room, which does not essentially inhere in the verdict itself." 9 Thus,
a showing of formal defects in the process of jury deliberation is per-
mitted, but not an examination of the motives or mental processes of
individual jurors.
If a jury considers extraneous evidence or engages in any other
misconduct while reaching its verdict,2 and if the court permits the
verdict that's being made by the jurors themselves. It is so fundamental that they
cannot attack their own verdict, can't impeach their verdict, it seems to me that we
need some law supporting that a juror can come in and make the statements to that
effect . . . [A]ssuming that there is a variance with the Court's instructions and,
assuming that some of the jurors followed that in lieu of what the Court said, yet can
you go into the jury room and prove that without running right head-on into that wall
that's been put up that jurors can't impeach their own verdict. That's the stonewall."
"Mr. Vann [Counsel for caveators]: Above that is the litigant's right to a fair and im-
partial trial."
" "This is so for the simple reason that the verdict was not rendered as the law
contemplates." 25z N.C. at 89, 113 S.E.zd at 14.
'a Wigmore suggests that jurors may possibly impeach their verdicts in Iowa, Florida,
Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas. Citations are
collected in 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2354 n.2.
"Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210 (1866). The opinion
gives some examples of matters not essentially inhering in the verdict; such as "that a
juror was improperly approached by a party, his agent, or attorney; that witnesses or
others conversed as to the facts or merits of the cause, out of court and in the presence
of jurors; that the verdict was determined by aggregation and average or by lot, or
game of chance or other artifice or improper manner . . . . " It goes on to state the
converse, "that such affidavit to avoid the verdict may not be received to show any
matter which does essentially inhere in the verdict itself, as that the juror did not
assent to the verdict; that he misunderstood the instructions of the Court, the statements
of the witnesses, or the pleadings in the case; that he was unduly influenced by the
statements or otherwise of his fellow jurors, or mistaken in his calculations or judgment,
or other matter resting alone in the juror's breast." In other words, the Iowa rule
permits jurors' testimony to show formal defects in jury conduct.
20 Generally speaking, jurors should consider only the information contained in
pleadings, properly admitted evidence, argument of counsel, and instructions of the
trial court. Klein v. Wilson, x67 Neb. 779, 94 N.W.2d 672 (t959); Scherz v. Platte
Valley Power Dist., ,51 Neb. 41S, 37 N.W.2d 721 (1949); Rothstein v. Monette,
17 N.Y.S.zd 369 (Albany City Ct. 1940 ) ; State v. Drainage Dist., 280 S.W.zd 683
(Mo. Ct. App. 1955). The importance of requiring all evidence to be properly ad-
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misconduct to be established (by juror affidavits or by testimony of an
eavesdropper or by any other means), then the court must decide
whether to set aside the verdict. Many courts apply the rule that a
new trial will be granted if "the extraneous matter could have a tendency
to influence the jury in arriving at its verdict in a manner inconsistent
with the legal proofs and the court's charge."'" In these jurisdictions
then, the inquiry is the reasonable likelihood or even the possibility
of prejudice, rather than the actual effect of the extraneous material.
This is in accord with the widely accepted principle that a court will
not appraise such subjective factors as beliefs, motives and reasoning
processes of individual jurors, = even when it does inquire into their
verdict. But when, as in this case, the jury has used unauthorized
definitions, some courts hold that whether such definitions were capable
of prejudicial effect on jurors is a problem "too delicate to be safely
made the basis of judicial inquiry."23  Therefore, they entertain a
conclusive presumption of prejudice once misconduct of this type has
been established, and set aside the verdict. In other jurisdictions the use
of unauthorized definitions (or other extraneous evidence) creates a
rebuttable presumption of prejudice.24  A number of courts examine
mitted in open court is generally said to be the opportunity of all parties to rebut
damaging evidence. Scherz v. Platte Valley Power Dist., supra; McLeod v. Humeston
& S. Ry., 71 Iowa 138, 32 N.W. 246 (1887); Guntzer v. Healy, 176 App. Div. 543,
163 N.Y. Supp. 513 (1917). In contrast to the modern restraints on sources of informa-
tion to be considered by a jury, the jurors once were chosen for personal knowledge of
the matters before the court, and were expected to rely on such prior knowledge in
reaching a verdict. See generally 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 373-74 (1768).
Even today, however, jurors are expected to rely on their personal knowledge of the
matters at hand when their knowledge is that which courts designate as "common
knowledge." This common knowledge exception to the requirement that evidence be
presented in open court seems to have greater currency in cases where a juror pro-
pounds facts in the jury room than where he propounds law (from an independent
source). However, for an exceedingly strict attitude towards propounding facts,
see Thomas v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 185 Kan. 6, 340 P.zd 379 (1959); the
errant juror read a book on properties of electricity and subsequently discussed with
other jurors the tendency of electricity to arc from one conductor to another when the
conductors are sufficiently close to each other. The court held that this was outside
the realm of common juror knowledge, and condemned the misconduct in these
words: ". . . for a jury to consider independent facts, unsifted as to their accuracy by
cross-examination, and unsupported by the solemnity attending their presentation on oath
before a judge, jury, parties and bystanders, and without an opportunity to contradict
or explain them can never be countenanced." Id. at-., 340 P.zd at 385.
"Palestroni v. Jacobs, io N.J. Super. 266, 271, 77 A.zd 183, T85 (1950).
52See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2349(a).
In re Collins' Will, x8 N.J. Misc. 492, 494, x5 A.2d 98, xoo (Cir. Ct. 1940).
5 4Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 738 (1957).
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all types of extraneous evidence without resort to presumptions to
determine whether the verdict should be set aside.26
The North Carolina court apparently would search for prejudice
without the aid of any presumption. But to the extent that the court in
the Hall case grounded its decision on the Delaval rule, prejudicial
effect of the extraneous evidence was not at issue. Apparently realizing
the injustice of which this rule is capable, the court suggested that trial
judges should exercise their discretionary power to set aside verdicts in
the event of prejudicial juror misconduct, even though no suspicion of
such misconduct would arise except for the juror affidavits. Circum-
vention of the Delaval rule in this manner may allow a court to reach
a more just result; however, outright repudiation of the rule would
better serve that purpose.
"'See Annot., 54. A.L.R.zd 738 (1957). In Washington Gas Light Co. v. Con-
nolly, 214 F.2d 254, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1954), Keech, J., (dissenting) states that "the
presumption of prejudice which flows from misconduct of a juror in criminal prosecu-
tions does not apply with equal force in civil actions" and cites authorities for the
presumption in criminal cases.
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